As part of the State, the Armed Forces must submit to the controls of the Executive, Congress, the Judiciary and other public institutions. In this article we analyze the institutional design, the process and the actors responsible for its control. We argue that in the Chilean case there is a weak control of responsibilities as a result of the relative autonomy that the Armed Forces have. because of the institutional design created before 1990 and partially modified since 1990. We present the conceptual tools from which we approach the issue; and an analysis of the institutions that establish the type of control relationship between Congress, the Comptroller's Office, the Judiciary, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Council for Transparency.
Dávila Avendaño, M., & Cárcamo Hun, R. (2020). ARMED FORCES AND THEIR INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL. Política. Revista De Ciencia Política, 58(1), 103–130. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2020.61593
Twitter