Nuclear Autocrats

Authors

Abstract

In this article it is stated that the possession of nuclear weapons in authoritarian regimes can become a guarantee for the political survival of the leaders and their elite. Based on process-tracing analysis of four representative case studies (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya), this article argues that nuclear programs shape devices in which regime change is understood as a threat to the security. These have been successful when authoritarian regimes have turned their resources into nuclear weapons or when they have accumulated capabilities that create a perception of risk against actors seeking democratization.

Keywords:

Authoritarian regimes, Nuclear weapons, Nuclear proliferation, Security, Regime change

Author Biographies

César Niño, Universidad de La Salle

Profesor Asociado de Relaciones Internacionales, Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Desarrollo Sostenible, Universidad de La Salle. PhD en Derecho Internacional, Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio (España); Magister en Seguridad y Defensa Nacionales, Escuela Superior de Guerra (Colombia). Profesional en Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia).

Manuel Camilo González, Universidad Sergio Arboleda

Magíster en Ciencia Política por la Universidad de Salamanca (España) y Profesional en Política y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia). Profesor de la Universidad Sergio Arboleda.